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In the Supreme Court of Iha Stale of Utah 
TRADE COMMISSION OF UTAH, STATE 
OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-A'PPellant, 
vs. 
SKAGGS DRUG CENTERS, INC., 
GRAND CENTRAL STORES, INC., 
d/b/a WARSHAW'S GIANT FOOD 
and GRAND CENTRAL DRUGS, INC., 
Defendants-Respondents, 
and 
UTAH RETAIL GROCERS' ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor-A'PPellant. 
Case No. 
11034 
BRIEF OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT 
UTAH RETAIL GROCERS' ASSOCIATION 
N.ArruR~J OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced by the Trade Commis-
sion of Utah to enjoin each of the defendants-respondents 
from selling merchandise in violation of the Utah Unfair 
Practices Act, particularly Sections 13-5-7 and 13-5-9, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. The Utah Re-
tail Grocers' Association intervened to urge the validity 
of the Unfair Practices Act, hereinafter sometimes re-
f errPd to as the "Act." 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to the lower court without a 
Jury. Many of the facts were undisputed, they having 
2 
been either admitted in defendants' answers or covered 
by stipulation of the parties entered into prior to trial. 
Based upon the nncontroverted facts and the evi-
dence adduced at the trial, the lower court found the 
Unfair Practices Act in its entiret,\' to be "unconstitu-
tional, void and unenforceable and in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, and in violation of the Utah Constitution, Article I, 
8ecions l, 2, 7, 18, 2:3 and 24, Artirl<• \'I, S<>ction 2G, 
and Article XII, Section 20." 
The lower court's ruling and judgment were based 
upon its conclusions that ( 1) the statutory presump-
tion of a 6% cost is arbitrary, unreasonablP and uncon-
stitutional, that it unconstitutionally shifts the burden 
of proof to the defendants, and that it constitutes "pricP 
fixing" by the legislature, (2) the statutory definitions 
of "cost" and "replacement cost" exclude certain legiti-
mate costs and discounts and place an "unreasonable 
burden" on the merchant requiring him to determine 
whether or not his prices are in violation of the Act, 
( 3) the prohi~ition of the intent to induce purchase of 
other merchandise by below-cost selling and the intent 
to "unfairly divert trade from a competitor" or "injure 
a competitor" is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous, 
and (4) the phrase "l<'gal price of a competitor" is un-
constitutional1y vague, ambiguous and nrn•nforceable be-
cause it requires a 11wrcha11t to detNrnirn~ at his peril 
whether or not tlw eompditor's pril·c• is lPgal. 
3 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
[ntervenor seeks a reversal of the judgment in the 
lower court and a declaration by this Court that the 
Utah Unfair Practices Act is valid and enforceable. 
STATEMEN'l' OF FACTS 
Tht> def end.ants, Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., herein-
after ref erred to as "Skaggs," and Grand Central Stores, 
Inc., d/h/a Warshaw's Giant Food and Grand Central 
Drugs, Inc., hereinafter jointly referred to as "Grand 
Central," are large "chain store" retail merchandising 
concerns, each of them operating many retail outlets 
in the Salt Lake valley and in other states and trade 
areas. The plaintiff Trade Commission of Utah, herein-
after referred to as the "Trade Commission," is an 
agency of the State of Utah charged with administra-
tion and enforcemt'nt of the Utah Unfair Practices Act. 
r:rhe intervenor, Utah Retail Grocers' Association, was 
organized to assist Utah retail merchants in their efforts 
to remain competitive, vigorous and economically healthy. 
During the period from enactment of Unfair Prac-
tices Act in 1937 until mid-1966 the Trade Commission 
actively enforced the Act through personal contact with 
off ending merchants and, when necessary, through in-
junction proceedings in the district courts (Tr. 71). (All 
references to fact and testimony will be made to the 
pages in the transcript of proceedings.) During that 
period below-cost selling was kept pretty well under 
control. Occasional below-cost selling effectively ceased 
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after a direct request by the Trade Commission. At no 
time did below-cost selling involve more than occasional 
items at any given time (Tr. 82-83). Certainly during 
that perjod below-cost selling ·was never used consistently 
as a Sf'lling devief'. 
Followjng a decisjon of tlw Utah Attorney General 
durjng mid-19()6 to ceasf' enforcement of tlw Act, pend-
ing a determination of its validity, however, violations 
of the Act hf'came more and more frpquent so as to 
involve large nnmbers of items at prices snhstantially 
below cost (Tr. 82-84). Below-cost selling became a 
weapon in the fight for markets and customers, char-
acterized by the deliberate use of below-cost selling to 
undercut, overwhelm and destroy competition. 
This unrestrained price cutting on a massive scale 
has had a disastrous effect on the small independent 
retailer with limited resources. Many of them were 
forced to fold up and quit ('l1r. 131). Those remaining 
have seen their profit margins fall drastically (Tr. 87) 
or completely disappear. By contrast, the large retailers 
with large reserves and many retail outlets are able to 
absorb a loss or offset it with profits from another trade 
area (Tr. 90-9~, 49, 121-122, S). 
In order to justify this deliberate, consistent and 
massive use of below-cost selling in violation of the Act, 
the large retailers point with great pride to their own 
"low-col't image" (Tr. 33-34, 54), which they are deter-
mined to protect and enhance at all costs (Tr. 24, 43, 29, 
50). Under no circnmstanePs will they consider be;ng 
5 
knowingly nndernold on any item (Tr. 24, 50), whether 
or not the prices of a competitor are legal (Tr. 43, 29). 
In fact, they claim to make no att0mpt whatever to de-
termine ·whether or not t11eir own prices or those of 
their cmnpetitors are legal (Tr. 11, 50). The result is 
an unrestrained contest in which the small retailers with 
limited resources are no match for the large concerns 
with superior resonr<>es and r0sPrvPs. 
Although the small rdail<'rs have on occas10n re-
sortt•d to bPlow-eost sP!ling, tlw advantage is clearly 
with the large retailer. The large chain stores can make 
np the loss in other areas where competition is not as 
great (Tr. 49, 121-122). Moreover, below-cost selling is 
more effective in a store wlrnre there is an extremely 
large inventory and a wide variety of goods (Tr. 8). 
Widespread loss leading results in an increase in the 
volume of goods which must be sold at a loss (Tr. 7), 
and the loss is much more detrimental to the small 
retailer since tlH,' dollar loss amounts to a higher per-
centage of his total volumP (Tr. 90-91). 
In this action only an injunction against admitted 
violations of the Act is prayed for and no criminal penal-
ties are sought to be imposed against either of the de-
fendants. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This appeal involns a direct challenge to the con-
stitutionality of the Act, which is a creature of the 
Utah Legislature. It is important, therefore, that the 
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following well-established rules be kept clearly in mind 
in reviewing the ruling of the lower court which found 
the Act unconstitutional. 
In order to he declared unronstitutional, the statute 
in question mnst cl<>arly violate some constitutional pro-
vision. State v. Nielsrn, 19 U.2d 66, 426 P.2d 13 (1967); 
Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Company, 
J8 lT.2d 45, 414 P.2d 9G3 (19GG), rl'hrarin.r;, 18 U.2d 27G, 
421 P.2d 504 (19GG); Wood 1'. B11d.qe, ll3U.2d 359, 374 
P.2d 516 (19(i2); Allen v. Merrell, (i U.2tl 32, 305 P.2d 
490 (1956); Parkinson v. Watson, 4 U.2d 191, 291 P.2d 
400 (1955); Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 284, 194 
P.2d 464 (1948); BroadlJent i·. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140 
P.2d 939 (1943); Lehi City v. M eiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 
P.2d 530 (1935); Utah Manitfacturers Assn. v. Stewart, 
82 Utah 198, 23 P.2d 229 (1933); State v. Packer Corp., 
77 Utah 500, 297 Pac. 1013 ( 19:31). 
The violation of some constitutional provision must 
be clear, complete and unmistakable. Gitbler v. Utah 
State Teachers Retirement Board, 113 Utah 188, 192 P.2d 
580 (1948); Snow v. K eddington, 113 Utah 325, 195 P.2d 
234 (1948). 
Every reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor 
of the constitutionality of the statute. Salt Lake City v. 
State Tax Comm., 11 U.2d 359, :359 P.2d 397 (1961); State 
1'. Geu.rts, 11 U.2d 345, 359 P.2d 12 (1961); State v. Riv-
enburgh, 11 U.2d 95, 355 P.2d 689 (1960), cert. denied. 
368 U.S. 922; Hou·r v. State Tu.r Comm., 10 U.2d 362, 
353 P.2d 468 (1960); Parki11so11 'I'. Watson, supra; State 
7 
Tax Cornm. 1:. Prerce, 1 U.2d 337, 266 P.2d 757 (1954); 
811011.' v. ]( rddington, sicpra; Gubler v. Utah State Teach-
ers Retirrnwnt Board, sUJJra; Broadbrnt v. Gibson, sup-
ra; Washington County r. State Tax Commission, 103 
Utah 73, 133 P.2d 5G4 (1943); L'tah Manufacturer Assn. 
c. St!'1rart, suzJrn; Staie v. Packer Corp., siipra; Jackson 
I'. Bonncuille Jrrigntinn Dist., ()() Ftah 404, 243 Pac. 107 
( 19'.W). 
The Coul't must makP n·er>· reasonahle presumption 
\\'hi('lt favors constitutionalit>·· (heat Salt Lake Author-
ity v. Island Ranching Co., supra; Allen v. iii errell, sup-
ra; Utah Manufacturrrs Assn. v. Stewart, supra; State v. 
Packer Corp., supra. The presumption of constitution-
ality is even strong-tT where, as in the present case, the 
statute has heen in effect for a long period without 
tiuestion as to its validity. Washington County vs. State 
Tax Commission, supra; Keetch v. Cordner, 90 Utah 423, 
!i2 P.2d 273 (1936). The Utah Unfair Practices Act has 
lwen in effect without prior challenge in this Court 
sine<' 1937. 
Those who assert the invalidity of the statute must 
hear the burden of showing its unconstitutionality. State 
v. J.B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 
( 1941); Stater. Packer Corp., supra. And their evidence 
must lPave no reasonable doubt but that the statute is 
unconstitutional. Stnte Board of Education v. Comm. of 
Finance, 122 Utah 164, 247 P.2d 435 (1952); Newcomb v. 
Ogden City Public School Teachers Retirement Fund, 
121 lTtah 503, 24:i P.2d 941 (1952); Broadbent v. Gibson 
su71ra. 
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Of prime significant in reviewing the ruling of the 
lower court in a case such as this is the rule that the 
courts must not seek for ways to invalidate a statute. 
Rather, the courts have a duty to investigate and, insofar 
as possible, discover any reasonable avenues by which 
the statute can be upheld. Jackson v. Bonneville Irriga-
tion District, supra; How<' v. State Tax Comm., supra; 
Lehi City v. llleiling, supra. 
If the wording of tlw statute is capable of different 
meanings, the court must adopt those meanings which 
uphold the constitutionality of the statute. Johnson v. 
State Tax Comm., 17 U.2d 337, 411 P.2d 831 (1966); 
Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers Assn., 11 U.2d 
421, 360 P.2d 1018 (1961), rehearing denied, 12 U.2d 189, 
364 P.2d 417 (1961); Rothfels v. Southworth, 11 U.2d 
169, 356 P.2d 612 (1960); Howe v. State Ta.r, Comm., 
supra; Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing 
Corp., 2 U.2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954); Newcomb v. Og-
den City Public School Teachers Retirement Fund, 
supra; Critchlow v. Monson, 102 Utah 378, 131 P.2d 794 
(1942); State v. Packer, s1tpra; Jackson v. Bonneville 
Irrigation District, supra. 
If there is -any reasonable basis for a finding of 
validity, the statute must be upheld, Allen v. Merrell, 
s11.pra. 
Reasonable minds mig·ht differ as to what length 
the legislature should go to protect small retailers. This 
Court, however, will not pass upon the wisdom, desir-
ability or necessitv of the Act and such questions are . . 
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not, therefore, in issue when determining its constitu-
tionality. Utah State Fair Assn. v. Green, 68 Utah 251, 
249 Pac. 1016 (1926); Thomas r. Daughters of the Utah 
Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477 (1948); State v. 
Packer Corp., supra; Allen v. Trnrman, 100 Utah 36, 110 
P.2d 355 (1941); State v. lllason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 
920 (19:~5); Alle11 v. Merrell, s1lpra; Parkinson v. Wat-
son, supra. 
Finally, this Court has rt>peatedly held that if any 
sd of facts will justify a statnte, the legislature will 
be presumed to have acted on the basis of those facts. 
State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, supra; Utah State Fair 
Assn. v. Green, supra; Thomas t'. Daughters of the Utah 
Pioneers, supra; State v. Mason, supra; Carter v. State 
Tax Comm., 98 Utah 96, 96 P.2d 727 (1939). 
ARGUMENT 
In the unregulated business climate of the nineteenth 
century, large business concerns frequently combined 
their efforts in deliberate concerted price manipulation 
to eliminate or destroy their less affluent competition. 
Having accomplished that goal through concerted price 
cutting, these large concerns could then quickly recoup 
their losses and make greater profits by raising their 
price above those which a competitive market would 
otherwise have justified. 
Realizing that such practices fostered monopolies 
of the large and the rich to the detriment of a truly 
free enterprise economy, the federal government at the 
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turn of the twentieth century abandoned the idealistic 
laissez faire philosophy of unrestrained competition and 
enacted the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which prohibited 
contracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint of 
trade and attempts to monopolize. ThP Sherrnan Act 
was, however, inadequate and im•ff Pctive in controlling 
many abuses "Thich continned to persist. Supplementary 
legislation was enacted in tlw form of the Clayton Act 
and the Federal Trade Commi:;;sion Art, to fill sonw of 
the remaining gapH. 
The purpose of these statutes was to preserve a 
competitive climate by preventing the large concerns, 
through the unrestrained use of Hize and resources alonP, 
from overwhelming and destroying their smaller com-
petitors. These statutes sought to presenTe the right of 
a competitor to PntPr a markf't and ('ornpPte with those 
already thPre. 
Following the great depression of the early 1930's, a 
movement developed toward chain store operations. Since 
these chain organizations operated in several different 
areas simultaneously, they were able to resort to cut-
throat tactics in areas where competition was great, and 
subsidize the r~sulting price war in an•as where compe-
tition was less stringent. Moreover, since they usually 
operated in markets where most of their competitors 
were small, their size alone enabled them to destroy their 
competitors. Although legislation existing at that time 
insured to some extent the right of a businessman to 
enter a market, tlw tactics of tlw chain stores made it 
apparent that thrre rnnst IH' a ("()(l<' of "fair pla~'" to 
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govern conduct after entry into the market. In response 
to this need the ];'ederal Government passed the Robin-
son-Patman Act in 1936. Oppenheim, Unfair Trade Prac-
tices 1-:~ (1965). 
Senral stat0s followed suit and passed Unfair Prac-
tice Acts, similar to the Utah Act in question, modeled 
after th0 Robinson-Patman Act provisions against dis-
criminator~' and nnn~asonahl~' low prices. Burt v. Wool-
s ulat," 100 11tah 15G, 14G P. 2d 203 (1944). Through 
1ms:mge of these statutes Utnh and other states created 
codes of conduct in the market place. These statutes to 
some extent guarantee that if a competitor is forced out 
of the market it will be the choice of the consuming public 
rather than th0 unfair tractics of his competitors. 
Although in the earlier years of their existence 
several of these unfair practice acts were found to be 
invalid, tlH:' great majority were upheld against the same 
challenges raised by the defendants in this proceeding 
against the Utah Act. 128 A.L.R. 1126 (1940). More-
over, after excluding statutes which contain terms not 
found in the Utah Act, the overwhelming weight of 
authority of the more recent decisions is in favor of 
tlwse Acts. 128 ALR 1126 (1940) and 4 ALR Bluebook 
of Supplemental Decisions 508 (1967). Almost without 
exception, those cases declaring such acts or portions of 
them invalid are readily distinguishable from the present 
<'ase. 
vVith the foregoing by way of background, this brief 
will consider, nnder the four separate headings which 
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follow, the lower court's ruling that the Act is invalid 
on constitutional grounds. 
POINT 1. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF A 6% COST, IN THE AB-
SENCE OF PROOF OF A LOWER COST, IS UNCONSTITU. 
TIONAL. 
The Act, which prohibit:;; sale:;; below cost, provides 
that "cost'' to a retail0r is his invoice or replacement 
cost ,,·ithin a thirty-day period, pln:;; freight, cartage, and 
the general cost of doing business. In the absence of 
proof of a lesser cost of doing business, the retailer is per-
replacement cost (less freight, discounts, etc.) as his cost 
of doing business. The retailer is also permitted to add 
an additional % of 1 % whert> ht> pay:;; for cartage. 
Although the defendants have raist>d tt'chnical objec-
tions to the foregoing statutory presumption of a 6% 
cost, it is highly significant that they have at no time, 
either in the evidence adduced by them at the trial or in 
argument to the lower court, claimed or even suggested 
that their costs of doing business are, or might be, as low 
as or or lower than 6%. As a matter of fact, such a claim 
could not be made in good faith because the actual costs 
of doing business, even in highly efficient retail opera-
tions, greatly exceed the 6% fignn•. The G% cost figure 
is actually slanted yery strongly in favor of the retail 
merchant, giving him evNy hmefit of tht• doubt. It per-
mits him, rnoreon'r, in the event his adnal costs of doing 
business should sornt'lrnw lw less than G%, to show that 
fact, and conduct his lrnsi1wss aceordingl:.·. 
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The lower court's conclusion that the 6% presump-
tion provides no real alternativP because it is "imprac-
tical" or "impossible" to pro\·e actual cost under defend-
ants' operating conditions is neitlwr supported by the 
evidPnce nor in accordance with tlw guide-lines estab-
li shNl by this court for determining the constitutionality 
of a statntP. 
Tl1e trial court i~1frrpreted the provision which 
allom-; tlw showing of a lesser cost as requiring an exact 
standard, h 1t such is not the case. The provision is 
much like the standard 10% deduction provisions in the 
federal and state income tax laws which permit a person 
to qualify for greater deductions upon presenting proof, 
in the form of regular accounting records and receipts, 
that such deductions are genuine. Certainly the record-
keeping required for tax purposes is no less burdensome 
or "impractical" than those required to show proof of 
actual costs nnder the Act. Granted, certain allocations 
of expenses must be madP, but any reasonable basis for 
such allocations would be acceptable under the Act. 
In the case of Balzrr 1;. Caler, 74 P.2d 839 (Calif. 
1938), a lower California court held a similar California 
statute invalid as requiring a showing of exact cost, and 
on this basis ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. 
'l'he lower comt held that the Act placed an impossible 
hnrdcn uvon any defrndant prosecuted under the act. 
ffowevc>r, when the Balzer case reached the California 
Nupreme Court, the portion of the lower court opinion 
c011strning cost as an l'Xact standard vvas not affirmed 
lff tlw ~~,upr:'JllP Court. 82 P.2d 19. ·when the issue fin-
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ally reached the California Supreme Court the contention 
that the statute required an exact standard of proof 
was rejected. People v. PayLrss Drug Stores, 153 P.2d 
9 (Calif. 1944); lVholesnle Tobacco Dralcrs Bureau v. 
National Candy & Tobacco Co., 82 P.2d 3 (Calif. 1938). 
The California court there held that "cost" meant a 
figure arrived at by reasonable accounting methods. An 
exart allocation was not reciuired. 
In so holding the California eonrt adoph>d the con-
struction of "cost" given in the ~\Vyoming case of State 
v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767 (1938). In the 
Langley case, a merchant prosecuted for a violation of 
the Wyoming sale-below-cost statute contended he was 
excused from compliance with the statute because the 
term "cost" was unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. 
The court rejected that contention and held that the 
statute was sufficiently clear to require compliance. The 
Langley opinion answered the contrary holding of the 
California lower court in Balzer v. Caler, supra., which 
was later disapproved also by the Supreme Court of 
California as noted above. The following language which 
represents the rationale of the Wyoming Supreme Court 
is equally applicable in the present case: 
"These illustrations suffice to show the ob-
stacles in the way of the legislature to do what 
the California Court abov0 mentioned intimates 
should be done, and that these matters had better 
be left to general business methods. The legisla-
ture, doubtless, had snch general business methods 
- rea~.;onahle standards of cost-accounting for tlw 
\'arions <:'lasses of business - in mind a11d be-
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lieved them to exist. If they do not exist - if 
cost cannot be ascertained - then the act in ques-
tion should be held unconstitutional. If, on the 
other hand, the cost is ascertainable, under reason-
able methods, then such cost is purely a question 
of fact, definite and certain, then the standard of 
conduct sd by the k>gislature, too, is definite and 
certain. 
* * * 
.. Hence, in tlw ahi,;encu of provis10ns to the 
contrary we must presum<' that the legislature did 
not infond to prescribe that the cost must be ab-
solutely exact, and that it must be based upon 
the precise method of accounting which any one 
merchant might adopt, but meant by "cost," what 
businessmen generally mean, namely, the approxi-
mate cost arrived at by a reasonable rule. Hence, 
if a particular method adopted by a merchant 
cannot, under the facts disclosed, be said to be 
unreasonable, and does not disclose an intentional 
invasion of the law, the method so adopted should 
be accepted as correct. In other words, all that 
a man is required to do under the statute is to 
act in good faith ... the standard set by the legis-
lature is virtually reduced to one of "reasonable-
ness." And it is held that "reasonableness" as 'the 
standard of an act, which can be determined objec-
tively by the circumstances, is a common, widely-
used, and constitutionally valid standard in law.'" 
(Emphasis added.) 
Accord, Associated Merchants of Montana v. Orm-
cshcr, 86 P.2d 1031 (l\font. 1939); State v. Sears, 103 
P.2d 337 (Wash. 1940); Dikcou v. Food Distributors As-
sociation, 108 P.2d 529 (Colo., 1940); Flank Oil Co. v. 
'/'e1111rssee Gns T rr111sm issio11 Co., :149 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 
1%0). 
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In People v. Kahn, 60 P.2d 596 (Calif. 1936), the de-
fendant raised the void-for-vagueness defense against 
the California sale below cost statute. The court there 
rejected the defendants' contention and held that the stat-
ute was sufficiently clear to require compliance. The 
rationale of the conrt was stated as follmn;: 
"It mnst bt> conceded that in manv cases it 
is going to be extremely difficult to determine 
what the cost of an articl~ is. \Ve are of the opin-
ion, however, that the diffienlty will lw a factual 
one, that of diseoypring the eost, as a truth, and 
not a legal one, that of discovering what the legis-
lature meant by the term. rrhe statute is, of 
course, not to be declared invalid because of any 
difficulty that may arise m applying its provi-
SlOTIS. 
* * * 
"Further support for our conclnsions that 
the provisions in question are not so uncertain 
that their enforcement ",rill constitute taking 
property and liberty withont due process is found 
in the fact that there is woven into the offense, 
as an essential element of it, an intent to injure 
competitors and destroy competition .... The re-
quirement of an intent tends to lessen the dis-
advantages that arise from creating an offense 
whosP boundaries are not too plainl)' lined." 
In construing the statute as requiring an exact com-
putation of cost, the lower court in this case ignored the 
rule of the cases cited at page 8, supra, that ·where a 
statute is capable of two constructions, one which vali-
dates it and one whieh does not, it shonld adopt the latter. 
In Jackson r. Bo11u,·ville lrri_qution Dist .. (iG lTtah 
404, 243 Pae. 107 ( 1926), this Court ltt> ld: 
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"If we are of the opinion that an interpreta-
tion is contended for that would render the statute 
nnconstitntional, it then becomes our duty to as-
certain whether or not somt> other interpretation 
within the meaning and intent of the legislature 
may not be given to the langnage employed that 
would render the statute constitutional, and there-
by nphold it validit~·." 
In construing tlw Utah Act as requiring an exact 
standard, th0 lo\ver court in the present case also disre-
gardPd tlw W('ll-f'stablished rule that a statute must be 
eonstrucd in acconfane(' with the general meaning given 
to a particular word, and when a word has a commonly 
understood meaning, it cannot be held to be vague or 
ambiguous. rrhus, in State v. NirlsPn, 19 U.2d 66, 426 
P.2d 13 (1907), this Conrt held: 
"A statute is sufficiently certain if it employs 
words of long nsage or with a common law mean-
ing, notwithstanding an element of degree in the 
dPfinition as to which estimates might differ." 
It is apparent from the record in this case that the 
respondents themselves did not regard the word "cost" 
as requiring an exact standard. So the lower court by 
holding that an t'xact standard is required, disregarded 
the meaning that the respondents themselves attribute 
to the \\·ord. In regard to the computation of costs, the 
respondents' own witness testifi0d as follows: 
'"Q. And yonr job is to maintain records so that 
yonr company officials can tell to the penn_y 
in .rnur quarterly rt:·ports what your profit 
i:'. tnte 1 
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"A. I would not say to the penny, sir. I would 
say that it is as practically as we can, be-
cause of the uncertainties that creep in, we 
endeavor to do that, but I wouldn't say it is 
to the penny. 
''Q. You do not compute to tlw dollar? 
"A. vVe compute it to the penny, but if you would 
say, 'If that is correct,' - I couldn't say that 
it is correct." (Tr. 107-108) 
* * * 
"Q. I take it that you are capable of producing 
and do produce for your management figures 
of net profit, net sales, and gross sales that 
are as accurate, insofar as they come down 
to the dollar figure, as those I asked Mr. 
Sinclair about for his company, isn't that 
true? 
"A. I would have to answer the same as Mr. 
Sinclair, I try to make them as accurate as 
possible, but always, common sense, there are 
contingencies that we do not always have pin-
pointed at the moment we figure off. That 
is a moment in time, and you can make your 
determination at that time, and something 
could come later, and you don't go back and 
change. 
"Q. Sure. "\i\That I am getting at, sir, is this is 
a computation such as is, a reasonably accur-
ate computation. lt is a general use in busi-
ness and has to be, isn't that true'? 
"A. That is truP." ('1'r. 12-±) 
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'T'he anthorities cited abo"\'e hold that the term "cost" 
nwans what hnsirn1ss men understand is meant by that 
term. Although the term "cost" may not be an exact 
figurP, it is clear that it can bl, calculated within reason-
abl,\' close limits h,\' the nsP of ordinary accounting records 
and conecpts. 'T'he testimon,\' of defendants' witnesses 
eonfirnrn that this is trne even as to the defendants' 
own operaLons. 'rlrns when pricing various items to be 
::-:old, tSkaggs first dl'termi110s its costs, including invoice 
eoc;t and cNtain opPrating costs which are allocated to 
fop :1('111: 
"Q. Now generally describe, if you would, to the 
court how, and let's take one of the items that 
is involved in this case, Bayer Aspirin, how 
does the store manager approve the pricing 
of their aspirin~ What are the factors that 
he considers in arriving at the price that 
Bayer is sold at a particular time~ 
''A. ~Well, Ba.\'er Aspirins would be somewhat 
different than some of the other items, on 
Bayer Aspirin, first of all on pricing any item 
you would arrive at its cost. The cost we 
would use would be invoice cost with any 
operating costs applied to that . .. " 
'rhus, ascNtainment of the cost of any item is not only 
possible, but at the present time is actually done by 
Skaggs before the item is priced. Moreover, the cost 
determination is arrived at by a reasonable accounting 
Jll("'thod ( 'T'r. 59). 
Both respondents at the pr<1sent time ascertain in-
voicP cost and several typt>s of overhead costs which 
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are then allocated. The Skaggs organization, for exam-
ple, allocates to retail items sold by it several types of 
expenses including invoice cost (Tr. 99), freight (Tr. 
101), and warehousing (Tr. 102). Although Skaggs 
makes no attempt to allocate advertising, it would bP 
simple to make such an allocation as to advertising which 
is aimed at a single item (Tr. 102). Skaggs admits that 
rent could be allocated, even though it is not (Tr. 104). 
There is no allocation of office exrwnse (Tr. 102), 
or utilities (Tr. 103), hut it is submitted that such an 
allocation could be made on some r0asonable basis with-
out undue difficulty or expense. 
With regard to the costs ~which Skaggs does not 
allocate to its merchandise, Mr. Sinclair, comptroller 
for the Skaggs organization, testified that such alloca-
tion was possible hut that it should not he required as 
it was in his opinion impractical and would involve 
Pxtra expense (Tr. 105-106). 
Mr. Hayward, comptroller for the Grand Central 
organization, testified that Grand Central does not allo-
cate freight costs (Tr. 114). This obviously is not an 
impossibility since Skaggs makes this allocation (Tr. 
101). Mr. Hayward testified that Grand Central allo-
cates relatively few costs to the product, because alloca-
tion of such costs are made to particular stores (Tr. 112-
124). The reason for thi:,; was statrd as follows: 
"Q. \Vhat would he your considered opinion on 
n~fining yonr accounting proeednres to the 
point where yon coulrl arriY<~ at a per unit 
pri<'f' of it0ms sold h>· Urnrnl C<·ntral '? 
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"A. \Ve are not concerned with per unit cost 
Jlt'r sc>. If the store, each unit, if it is going 
to bear its share of the operation we are con-
cerrn~d principally with generating enough 
gross dollars to 1m~' all of the costs of oper-
ation and leave something over, or something 
ld"t aftfT taxes for management and owner-
ship." ('T'r. 118) 
1lr. Ha~·-ward, like l\Ir. Sinclair, gave as the reason 
for tht> failnn~ to alloeatc> all costs to the merchandise 
\ms hm:ieally one of inconvPnience and additional ex-
pc·m:'.'. Ii<> ach:dted that snch an allocation was not im-
possihle ('T'r. 119). 
It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Randall 
that it would be possible to allocate enry item of over-
head (Tr. GO-G3). His only rPservation was that it would 
involvP additional PXpPnse. 
'l1 here is absolutely no basis in the evidence for the 
apparent conch~sion that further refinement of account-
ing procedures used by either of the defendants would 
be or is an impossible or even an impractical alternative. 
On the contrary, the ·witnesses for both respondents ad-
mitted that more detailed cost allocation is possible (Tr. 
105-lOG, 119). It is clear that defendants' objertion is in 
rt>ality one of convt:·nit>ncl' and practicality rather than 
irnpossihility. As noted above, however, mere inconven-
iPncc· or difficulty in apvlicatlon of the "cost" standard 
will not jnsii\ th(• invalidation of the entire Act. 
It is C'll'ar that in Utah, as in many other states, 
lll!'l'P diffie11lfr in eompl~'ing with the law is no excuse. 
In W. F. Jensen Candy Co. v. State Tax Cormn., 90 Utah 
359, 61 P.2d 629 (193G), the ::.;tate had imposed a sales 
tax of 2% on all transactions. The plaintiff'::.; sales were 
made up mainly of items priced below 50¢. Thus lw 
claimed that he should not haye to turn over a tax to 
the state because it would hP difficult, if not impossible, 
to collect the tax which on many sales inYolved a frac-
tion of a <'ent. 
This Court there noted several alternatives the plain-
tiff could follow, such as kel'ping track of fractional salPs 
with regular customers until the tax equalled an amount 
for which there was a monetary denomination, or, the 
court noted, the plaintiff could absorb the tax himself. 
This Court held that mere difficulty in complying 
with the law was no excuse for non-compliance. That 
holding was reaffirmed in the recent case of Robert H. 
Hinckley, Inc. v. State Tax Com in., ] 7 U.2d 70, 404 P.2d 
662 ( 1965), which involved similar facts. Ref erring to 
the J Pnsen case, this Court noted in Hinckley that: 
"The fact that in sales of less than 50¢ the 
collection of the tax may be difficult does not 
change the responsibility of the vendor for the 
collection and accounting to the state for the tax 
imposed." 
The rule that mere difficulty in compliance is no 
excuse is basPd on sound rt~asoning and is necessary if 
the laws of this state are to have any meaning. 1\fan!· 
laws of the state would be nwaningless if mere difficulty 
in eompliance was an excusP: regulated industries eonld 
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refuse to snpply the administrative authorities with fi-
nancial records; taxpayers could refuse to keep records 
of income; corporations could refuse to submit an annual 
n'port to the state; litigants could refuse to comply with 
discoven- proeednres. 
Cases dcaling :::;peeificall~, with sale-helow-cost stat-
utes have lwld that mere difficulty of application is not 
enough to enable the court to hold the statute unconsti-
t ational. J[ cf.,'lonP v. Gcror, 292 N.W. 414 (Minn. 1940); 
Ilill u. Ku.;y, :i5 N.\V.2d 594 (tfrh. 1949); People v. Kahn, 
GO P.2d 59ti (Calif. 19~i6). 
The rule that mere difficulty and inconvenience do 
not excuse noncompliance with a statute is not changed 
by the fact that certain rebates and free goods often 
are given to retailers such as the defendants. Here again, 
an exact computation and allocation of these rebates and 
free goods may not be possible to determine at the time 
the goods are priced. However, it is clear that a reason-
ably accurate allocation of those items can be made for 
purposes of compliance with the Act and a reasonable 
effort in that regard is all that the law requires or 
expects. 
In this regard it should be noted that here again 
the respondents failed to offer any evidence whatever 
m; to the significance of these rebates and free goods 
in computing cost. This failure, despite the Utah rule 
that om' ,vho asserts the unconstitutionality of a statute 
lias the bnrden of vroving its invalidity by clear, com-
plt>t<> and unmistalrnhlf' evidence, suggests that in the 
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overall process of computing "cost" the rPhates and fre<> 
goods have an insignificant t>ffed. 
Even if the amount of the rebate is assumed to hr 
significant in relation to the volume of goods which 
\:'arn the rehah', there is no evidence as to its significance 
in relation to the entire operation of the respondents. 
If the effect is insignificant, no constitutional prohibi-
tion has been violated. Merel:-• because a statute does 
not fit smoothly and conYeniently into ewry conceivahl, 
situation is no ground for striking it clown. This Court 
ht>ld in the case of StatP 1:. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 
supra, that a statute is not unconstitutional merely be-
cause it does not cover every conct>ivable fact situation 
which may arise. In that case this Court noted that the 
merf' fact of some overlap in classifications contained 
in a statute does not makt> the act arbitrary or invalid. 
The legislature is not requirt>d to make a perfect classi-
fication. There are uncertaintit>s and eontingencies in 
Pvery computation of cost. The rebates and free goods 
make cost allocation to individual products no more un-
cPrtain than in the computation of cost for profit and loss 
statPments ('T'r. 107-10~. 124). 
·with regard to rt>hates, it should be noted that, as 
with the "cost" concept, defendants' objections do not 
go to the imvossibilit~- of compliance but to a rpfusal 
of the respondt•nts to accept the incom·c·nience and addi-
tional cost ,,·hieh compliance im-oln•c:. ln this regard it 
is intert>sting· m1cl sig11ificm1t to notv that tlw respond-
<-'nts' acconnti11g systems nn' nppan·~1t!Y sHt'l'icienth- rP-
fined to pass muster in other states where below-cost 
statutPs art> enforct>d (Tr. lOG-lOi). 
It is common in accounting to make reasonable esti-
mates of unknown factors and take these estimates into 
account in computing costs. Respondents do this in re-
gard to utilit>T expPnsps ('I'r. 104). Obviously such a 
lffartieP is an aeceptahle aecounting procedure (Tr. 59), 
and could, if n<:'cessar.Y, be used in allocating rebates 
\'"hich an• unknown at tlw tinw of 1iricing. 
'L'he lower court's holding th.at the option to show 
''proof of a lesser cost" is no real alternative disregards 
the fact that the legislature was obviously aware of the 
increased ac{?ounting burden that the statute would re-
quire. Their cognizance of this difficulty is evidenced 
hy the 6% presumption itself which was inserted into 
the act so as to give the retailer an option; a retailer 
may either undertake the detailed accounting which the 
act requires, or merel>· presume a cost of doing business 
Pqual to G%. 
Since the legislature was aware of the increased ac-
counting burden, the difficulty in compliance goes to 
the wisdom of the act. As previously noted, questions as 
to the desirability or wisdom of legislation are not ques-
tions to be considered by the courts in ruling on the 
c-onstitntionalit~· of statutes. 
The respondents offered testimony that the in-
erPaseJ acconnting burden would result in higher prices 
t•l tlH' cons1:rnPr. Again. tlwre is no evidence as to the 
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extent to which prices would increase. The evidence 
shows that any significant expense would only be in-
curred once when the formula for allocation was ascer-
tained (Tr. 60-63). The large retailers use computers 
(Tr. 118, 109), v.rhich could easily make tlw allocation once• 
the formula was ascPrtain0d. 
En•n if it be assumed, m the absence of evidence~ 
that prices would increase as the result from the in-
ereased accounting burden required b~, tlw Act, this 
court has held that the cconomjc effect of a statufr 
should not be considered when ruling on the constitution-
ality of the statute. In Utah State Fair Assn. vs. Green, 
()8 Utah 251, 249 Pac. 101() (192G), this Court stated: 
"Neither the economic effects nor the moral 
pffects of our determination has any place in our 
deliberations .... These are questions with which 
we have nothing to do in the instant case. The~' 
belong to the coordinate branch of the state gov-
ernment - the legislature ... " 
The lower court concluded that the 6% presumption 
is arbitrarv and unreasonable in that it applies to all 
types of goods and to all types of merchants. (Conclusion 
1 (a) ) This conclu.sion reflects a misunderstanding of 
thf' purposf' of thf' 6% presumption. 
rrhe obvious purpose bd1ind the fi% presumption 
was to aid thP rPtailer and not to restriet him. This 
purpose is apparent by comparing the G% presumption 
of the Utah Unfair Practices Act to tlw 10% standard 
deduction of the -U'ederal and fltate lnconw Tax Laws. 
Under the Federal and State Income Tax Laws the 
' permissible deductions are numerous. Any taxpayer 
knows that he must undertake a substantial record keep-
ing and accounting hnrden in order to justify a claim 
for the' many minor expenditures which constitute al-
lowable deduction8. \Vere it not for the 10% standard 
dt>duction, the taxpa)-er would be forced to either keep 
track of his many expenditures or altogether lose the 
liend'it of the dPduction. In order to avoid this dilemma, 
Congr<'ss in its di8cretion wisdy gave the taxpayer a 
choic0: either the taxpayer can be prepared to prove 
his deductions, or, if he feels the burden is too great, he 
may avoid that burden and take advantage of the statu-
tory presumption that his deductions amounted to 10% 
of his adjusted gross income. Thus, it is clear that the 
10% standard deduction was drafted for the benefit of 
thP taxpayer and not to restrict him. 
:Sirnilarl>-, the Utah Legislature was aware of the 
increased accounting burden which might be involved 
in proving actual costs under the Unfair Practices Act 
<lue to the more detailed cost accounting records which 
could be required in some instances to compute the 
prices of the various items offered for sale. Realizing 
that some retailers would prefer not to go to the trouble 
of proving actual costs, the Legislature gave the retailer 
a choice to either prove his actual costs or, at his option, 
take advantage of the presumed cost of 6%. It is, there-
fore, ironic that this attempt by the Legislature to pro-
vide an option to avoid the necEc'ssity of proving cost 
is sPized npon by the respondents as an excuse for 
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non-compliance. By declining to utilize the very gener-
ous presumption of the Act while at the same time claim-
ing that the proof of actual cost is arbitrary indefinite 
' ' 
impractical and jnconvenient to determine·, the respond-
ents seek, in effect, "to have their cake and eat it too." 
The respondents seek to have this Court hold that in 
ordf'r to have a valid sf'lf'-lwlow-cost statute then• must 
he some provision made to have rf'spon<lPnts' cost ac-
counting done for thf'rn. 
Since thP purpose of the 6% presmnption is in 
reality to benefit and convenif'ncf' the respondents, and 
was jncluded in the Act onl~T for that purpose, thP 
respondents should not he in a position contest its va-
lidity. One cannot assert the invalidity of a statutory 
provision which benefits him, Kent ClulJ v. Toronto, fi 
lT.2d 67, 305 P.2d 870 (1957); Salt Lake City Lines 1;. 
Salt Lake City, 6 lT.2<l 428, :11;) P.2d 8;)9 (1%7). 
Even if it be assumed, for the sake of argument, 
that the statute must accurately reflect the costs of the 
various classes of goods, therf' is absolutely no evidence 
that the 6% presumption fails in this respect. 
Respondents had the burden of showing the 6% pre-
sumption to be unreasonable by "clear, complete and 
unmistakable evidence." Hovw~ver, there is no evidencf' 
as to what a reasonable percentagP markup is in regard 
to any item involved in this <·as<>. 
ln the ahsence of such Pvid<,nce, the ::statute is en-
titlP<l to the presumption that it is reasonahle. 
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'rhe holding of the lower court that the 6% pre-
sumption is arbitrary as between different types of mer-
chants is also not supported by the evidence. On th<> 
contrar.Y, the evidence establishes that the invoice costs 
to small merchants are essentially the same as costs to 
the large 11wrchants due to the practice of the small mer-
chants of combining tlwir hnying power (Tr. 95-96). 
Th(' contention that snch a statute is discriminatory 
or arbitrary as to classification between large and the 
:'rnnll m0rehants was fully answered in the case of Peoplr 
1. 0-onlon, 234: P.2d 287 (Calif. 19Jl): 
"The unconstitutionality of the act on that 
ground is argued without citation of any authority 
on the ground that large chain stores can purchase 
at lower prices than individual grocers, who are 
prevented from competing with these larger con-
cerns because they may not sell below their own 
higher costs. 'l'his reasoning was rejected with 
respect to the requirement of uniform operation 
of Article 1, Section 11 of the California Consti-
tution in Wholesale Tobacco Dealers v. National, 
etc., Co., 11 Cal. 2d 634, 661, 82 P.2d 3, 18, where 
it is said: 'If there is any theoretical discrimina-
tion resulting from the statute, it is due to the 
fact that the law is uniform in operation, and 
does not classify.' Moreover, according to that 
decision the danger of unequal effect mentioned 
by appellant is remedied in the statute itself 'by 
exemption from operation of the statute, any en-
deavor made in good faith to meet the legal prices 
of competitors.' The latter argument seems de-
cisive also with respect to equal protection clause 
of the 14th Amendment, without necessity to in-
vestigate whether such provision in the statute 
wonk! violate that rlatrne." 
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In accord with the Gordon decision are Wholesale 
Tobacco Dealers Bureau 'V. National Candy and Tobacco 
Co., 82 P.2d 3 (Calif. 1938); Fredericks v. Burnquist, 292 
N.W. 470 (Minn. 1940). 
In the present case, tlw lower court held the Act 
unconstitutional because it provides criminal penalties 
and therefore tlw 6% presumption unconstitutionallv 
shifts the hnrden of proof to the defendant (Conclusion 
1 (c)). 
At the outset, it should he noted that this is a civil 
case and not a criminal case. There has been no attempt 
to invoke the criminal provisions of the statute against 
the respondents in this case and therefore criminal stand-
ards should not be applied. Avella 'V. Alniac's, 211 A.2d 
665 (R.I. 1965). It is clear in Utah that a party has 
no standing to question the validity of criminal sanctions 
of a statute which are not invoked against him, State 
v. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P.2d 647 (1944), appeal 
dismissed, 324 U.S. 829, rehearing denied, 324 U.S. 891. 
Moreover, a litigant should not be allowed to prevail 
over his adversary in a civil dispute merely because of 
the possibility that some criminal sanction provided in 
the statute may prejudice the rights of some unknown 
('riminal defendant at sonw future date . 
.1£ven if the criminal standard is applied, the holding 
of the lower court that the 6% presumption shifts tlH' 
burden of }Jroof is not in aceordanc(~ with Utah la\Y. It 
ignores the distinction lwhn'en "l>Lffckn of proof," whfrlt 
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cannot be shifted, and "burden to come forward with 
evidence," which may be shifted after the state has 
proved a prima facie case. 
It is clear in Utah that a statute may impose upon 
a defendant the burden to come forward with evidence 
after a prima facie casf' has been proved. More import-
ant to the matter at hand, the statutf' may validly mah 
the defendant's failure to come forward "rith evidencf' 
an element of the prima facie case. 
For example, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 
76-31-1, states that "possession of property recently 
stolen, when the person in possession fails to make satis-
factory explanation, shall be deemed prima facie evidence 
of guilt." (Emphasis added.) 
rrhe validity of Seeton 76-31-1 has been repeatedly 
npheld against the contention that it shifts the burden 
of proof to the defendant in a criminal case: State r. 
Little, 5 U.2d 42, 296 P.2d 289 (1956); State v. Wood, 2 
U.2d 34, 2G8 P.2d 998 (1954); State v. Patella, 40 Utah 
56, 119 Pac. 1023 (1912). It is apparent from these 
cases that it is constitutionally permissible in a criminal 
case to include as an ell'ment of the prima facie case 
the failure of the defendant to explain certain conduct, 
and that the dcff'ndant has the burden of producing 
evidence after the prima facie case is shown. 
In the abow-cikd statute, as in the 6% presump-
tion provision, tlw state has the burden of proving a 
violation before the defendant is required to make any 
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explanation. Moreover, the burden to convince the trier 
of fact beyond a reasonable doubt remains on the state 
throughout the case despite the shifting of the burden 
of corning forward with the evidence . .More simply stated, 
"In a criminal case, the burdPn of proof never shifts, 
hut the burden of evidence may shift freqnPntly." State 
r. llloorman, 321 P.2d 2:3() (Mont. l9;5R). 
A prt>surnption as to cost, in the absencP of a show-
ing of a less(,r cost, has lwen held not to unconstitution-
ally shift the burden of llroof to tlw ddendant. Thus, 
in McElhone v. Geror, 292 N.W. 414 (.Minn. 1940), the 
court held: 
"No constitutional question arises from allow-
ing the trier of fact, in the absence of evidence 
taking the question out of the realm of fact, to 
find that a retailer's costs W('re at least 10% of 
the invoice price of his goods. Such a procedural 
device is well within those limits of reason and 
fairness within which, even in a criminal case, the 
burden of going on with evidence may be shifted 
to the defendant. It is too plainly a reasonablP 
aid to the prosecution without subjecting the ac-
cused to hardship or oppression to be open to 
the challenge of unconstitutionality." (Emphasis 
added.)· 
The lower court's conclusion that the 6% presump-
tion constitutes price-fixing by the Legislature, because 
there is no realistic alternatin• to the G% ym•snrnt>cl 
cost. cannot be sustained. 
The issue as to wlwther a sho,,·ing of a lesser cost 
18 a real alternative has alr<>ad.\· !wen eonsiclerPd above. 
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Further, it should be notrd that the legislature was not 
iirecluded by tlw Utah Constitution from price-fixing. 
The provisions of Article XII, Section 20, do not apply 
to the legislature, Biggins v. District Court, 89 U. 183, 
51 P.2cl 645 (1935). Moreover, if the state is precluded 
from price-fixing, it could not control tlw rates of public 
utilitit>s or common carriPrs. 
'rlw Unfair Practices Act is not a price fixing meas-
ll l'P in an.'· event. Bitrt v. vVoolsulatr, s11pra; WholesalP 
To/;occo Dealers Bureau 'V. Nat1:oual Candy and Tobacco 
Co., supra; Bust v. Griggs, 113 8.vV. 2cl 733 (Tenn. 1938). 
In regard to the 6% presumption generally, it is 
significant to note that those statutes from other states 
which allow a defendant the option to prove a lesser cost 
or assume a perct>ntage markup have been upheld. 
In Bust v. Griggs, supra, a Tennessee sale-below-cost 
!"tatntt> had a provision defining cost similar to the Utah 
provision. It defined the markup component of cost as 
follmvs: "Which markup, in the absence of proof to 
the contrary, shall be 6%." 'l'he court held this to be a 
valid prt>snrnption: 
"There is nothing unusual in the further pro-
vision of Section 1 that the markup 'in the ab-
sence of proof to the contrary, shall be 6%.' The 
effect of this is that proof of a markup of less 
than 6% is prima facie evidence that a sale has 
been made at less than the minimum cost of dis-
tribntion. This is merely a rule of evidence adop-
tt~d by an act of the legislature. This court has 
said that 'the power of the legislature to pre-
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scribe rules of evidencP, and to declare what shall 
he evidence, is practically um·c,strained, and legis-
lation, to thosP Pnds, will be upheld so long as 
it is impartial and uniform, and does not pre-
clude a party from exhibiting his rights.' Tlw 
presumption thm; ('reafr·d of ('011rSP, mav he l'P-
hnttPd.'' 
In Great Atlantic a11d Pacific Ten Company v. Ervi11, 
~3 Fed. Supp. 70 (Dist. Minn. 19~18), although tht- court 
lwld the statute in question unconstitutional on ground·< 
"Which do not apply to the> instant ca:~(', the> court s1wcifi-
cally held that the legislature may properly presume that 
the markup may be fixed at 10% in the ahsP1we of a 
sho\ving of a lesser markup. 
In McElhone v. Geror, supra, tlw l\linnPsota statutt' 
declared that any sale made at 10% above the manu-
facturer's published list prirP was prirna facie evidencP 
of violation of the act. The court lwld that it could not 
find the presumption arbitrary or unreasonable because 
the defendant had failed to off er any evidence as to 
what was reasonable or what his costs actually amounted 
to. As prPviously noted, tht-n, i:-; a similar failnre of 
t-vidence in this cast-. 
In State 'V. Co11sumcrs Warehouse Morkct, 329 P.2d 
638 (Kan. 1958), tlw C'ourt li0ld that a provision in the 
Kansas statute which set tlw imu!rnp of rdailers at G%. 
in the absenC'e of ]Jl'OOf ol' ]<'~~St'l' <·O:'ll>', \\'aS not arbitrarv, 
tmn•asonahle or di~criminator~·. 
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POINT 2. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
PRESUMPTION OF INTENT FROM A SALE BELOW COST 
AND LIMITATION ON SUPPLY PER CUSTOMER IS UN-
CONSTITUTIONAL. 
The lower court held that it is unconstitutional, due 
to the criminal element of the statute, to presume an 
intent to injure competition from a sale below cost where 
tl1e customer is limited in the number of items he may 
pmcliase at a particular price (Conclusion 1 (1) ). This 
liolcling is elearl~· errorn•ous. 
First of all, it should be remembered that this is 
not a criminal proceeding and in any event, as previously 
noted, this Court has held that the defendant has no 
standing to assert the invalidity of a provision not in-
voked against him. Moreover, a civil litigant should not 
hr> allowed to prevail over his adversary merely because 
of a criminal provision with ·which neither is directly 
eoueerned. As will be demonstrated, however, the pre-
snmption in the present case is valid even if the criminal 
prnvision were to be applied. 
In California a provision which allows a presump-
tion of intent from the mere sale below cost, without a 
limitation of supply, has been held valid. The additional 
provision in thP Utah statute, prohibiting a limitation 
of supply, makes the California decision apply with even 
greater forcP to the situation at hand. 
In People v. Payless Drng Stores, 153 P.2d 9 (Calif. 
1 ~l-J.-1), tlw <'Olll't lwld that a presumption of unlawful in-
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tf>nt may follow from thf> fact of th0 sale helow cost. ThP 
court held as folJows: 
"A statutory requirement that fop defendant 
go forward with evidf'nce to rehut a prima facie 
showing of guilt:-.' inh•nt from proof of specified 
facts is permissihle wlwn the n·sult Las somE' ra-
tional relation to those facts and tlw defE'ndant is 
given a fair opportunity to med it hv evidence. 
}forrison v. California, .291 U.8. 82, 8~, 54 S. Ct. 
281, 284, 78 Law Ed. GG4. That case designates as 
the test of permic.;s;bilit>· that 'the state shall havr! 
proved enough to uah• ;t ,iirnt for tlw defon~lant 
to be required to repel what has been proved with 
excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a 
balancing of convenience or of the opportunities 
for knowledge the shifting of the burden ~will be 
found to be an aid to the accuser without sub-
jecting the accused to hardship or oppression.' 
Our statutf' does not withdraw from the accuser 
the burden of proving a violation, nor does it 
deprive the defendant of the henefit of a presump-
tion of innocence. Here there was a manifest dis-
parity in conveniencE~ of proof and opportunity 
for knowledge as between plaintiff and the de-
fendants. The defendants were in a better posi-
tion to know the intent and purpose of their 
conduct, which it might be difficult for the plain-
tiff to prove. The legislature merely enacted into 
lmv what is common in human experience, that 
when a person causes inj11ry by his acts, he should 
he deem0d to intc~nd 8nch consequences unless he 
can f'xcns0 or t•xplain his conduct by facts showing 
that he had an innoc<•nt intent. It was so enacted 
to avoid tlw possihl<· concl11sion that the accuser, 
from whom tlH' ckfl'ndants' pnrpose is gf'llCrally 
concPakd, must pndtl<'(' Hfl';nnative l'\'id<>ncc of 
!l"niltY int<:>nt in <'v(•n· :-;itnation in onl<'r to make ,..., . . 
ont a prima fo<·ie en.:~c' of a Yiolation of Hw ad. 
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After. proof of the sales below cost and injury 
resultmg therefrom, there is no undue hardship 
cast upon the defendants to require them to come 
forward with evidence of their true intent as 
against the prima facie showing, or with evidence 
which will bring tlwm within a specified excep-
tion in the act. The power to enact such a pro-
vision in appropriate cases has been upheld in 
this state." Accord, State v. Eau ClairP Oil Co., 
151 N.~W.2d G34 (Wisc. 1%7). 
In Rocky Mountain WholcsalP Company v. Ponca 
Wholesale M prcmitile Company, 360 P.2d 643 (N.M. 
19fi 1 ) , the court held a similar provision to be valid: 
"Appellant argues that Section 49-3-3(b), ... 
quoted above, in providing that proof of facts 
specified therein 'shall be prima facie evidence of 
intent to injure competitors and to destroy or 
substantially lessen competition' is invalid and 
unconstitutional because there is no rational con-
nection between the facts declared to constitute 
prima facie proof and the facts inferred there-
from or 'presumed' as stated by appellant. We 
are satisfied that there is a rational and reason-
able relationship between the facts required to be 
proved and the conclusion based thereon by direc-
tion of the statute, and the statutory provision 
is constitutional and valid." 
In Mering v. Yolo Grocery and Meat Market, 127 
P .2d 985 (Calif. 1942), the court upheld a statutory pro-
Yi::-;ion which allowed a presumption of unlawful intent 
from proof of a sale below cost and an injurious effect: 
"Appellants contend that a finding that they 
violated the act cannot be based upon this pre-
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snmption. The power of the legislature to create 
the presnmptions and prima faciP e\'idence, is 
wt'll established .... 'rhe statP, in the exercise of 
its general power to pr0scrilw rnles of evidence, 
may provide that proof of a particular fact, or 
of several facts takPn collectivd~', i::;hall he prirna 
facie evidence of another fact \vlwn there is a 
relation between the fact vroved and nltimat<· 
presumed. The legislative presumption is invalid 
where it ii::; entirely arbitrary, or creates an in-
vidious discrimination, or operates to deprive a 
party of a r0asonable opportunit~, to present 
pertirn•nt facts in his dPi'c·n~·<' .... ] n the present 
case there is a manifest connection between the 
fact proved and the fact presumed, and under 
the construction placed upon the statute by tlw 
state court, there appears to be no deprh'ation of 
a full opportunity to present all facts relating to 
operations within the fi<'ld .... Having in mind 
the purposes of the act declared by the lPgisla-
ture, we are convinced that under the facts shown 
b~- tlw record in this case, tlwre is a rational 
relationship between the facts proved and tlw 
ultimate fact presumed, and the presumption of 
intent to injure competitors or dPstroy competi-
tion which Section 5 of the act deduces from proof 
of sale below cost, together with proof of an in-
jurious effect of such sales, does not operate to 
deprive the party of a reasonable opportunity to 
lffesent pPrtinent fads in his defense." 
In JI c!Jdire 1.·. Borofsky, 59 A. 2d 471 (N.H. 1948), 
the court upheld a provision that sale lH'low cost was 
prima faci(• evidence of a \'iolation ap:a!nst tlie allega-
tion that it was unconstitutional. Tl1<' eonrt specificall~ 
noted that tlu·re '"as u rn ti on al enm;, ·ctio11 lw ~ iY<'<'n st•ll-
i ng h(']O\\' co:-:t and an i111t·nt tn in,iun• competition. 
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In Laundry Operating Company v. Spalding Laun-
dry & Dry Cleaning Company, 383 S.W. 2d 364 (Ky. 
1964), the court held that proof of intent to gain business 
from a competitor was proof of intent to injure thfl 
rompetitor. Tlw conrt tlwrfl statfld: 
"It seems to havfl been the feeling of the 
trial court that because Spalding bore no ill will 
toward Dixie, and was motivated primarily by a 
desire to increase its own business rather than a 
sp(•cific purpose to injure Dixie, there can be no 
justifiable infe>renc0 of a purpose to injure com-
petitors and destro~- competition. This, we be-
lieve, ignores the realities of life. There are many 
instances in which sales efforts may create new 
business where none existed before, but when a 
seller of goods or services solicits the business 
of a customer whose acquistion he knows will 
result in a loss of that customer by a competitor, 
the intent to bring about that loss is inextricable 
from the intent to effect a gain in business for 
the proselyter. They are one and the same. 'It 
may be presumed in a civil action that the natural 
and probable consequences of the act were in-
tended by the actor.' Dikeou v. Food Distributors 
Ass'n, 107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529, 534 (1940). In 
'Through the Looking Glass' we are told the wal-
rus shed copious tears as he devoured the inno-
cent oysters who had accepted his invitation to 
stroll along the beach. He meant them no harm, 
of course. He merely wished to eat them. 
"We do not suggest that a purpose to divert 
or capture a competitor's business is wrong or 
unethical. It is perfectly legitimate so long as 
it is not carried out unfairly. The legislature 
simply has declared it unfair to .accomplish. it 
through giving away goods or services or selling 
th0m for less than cost." 
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Even if the criminal provJS10n of the statute were 
to be considered in ruling upon this question, the pre-
sumption is not invalid. 
The test for the validity of a presumption in a crimi-
nal case >vas defined by the United Statrs 8npreme Court 
in the case of Tot 1:. United Stntes, :-ng lT.8. 4G:-3, R7 L.c'd 
1519 (1943), as follows: 
"Undc•r our decisions, a statutory presump-
tion cannot be sustained if there lw no rational 
connection between the fad prO\·ed and the ulti-
mate fact presumed, if the inference of the one 
from proof of the other is arbitrary because of 
lack of connection between the two in common 
experience. This is not to say that a valid pre-
sumption ma~- not be created upon a view of 
relation broader than that a jury might take in 
a s1wcific case. But where the inference is so 
strained as not to have a n~asonable relation to 
the circumstances of life as W(~ know them, it is 
not competent for the legislature to create it as 
a rule governing the procedure of courts." 
The above test was recently reaffirmed in United 
States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. G3, 13 L.ed 2d 658 (1964): 
United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 13(), 15 L.ed 2d 210 
( 1965). The test has been the pr<-'vailing rule in the 
Supreme Conrt since 1910, .1Io71ile, J. & K. C. R. Com-
pany 1'. T11rnispeed, 219 lU~. ;)5, 5;) L.Pd 78 (1910). 
TlH:' test as d<>fiiwd in the Toi eaS(-' is clearly the 
rnajorit~- rnle in thP United Stat(•s. Ln mi extensive re-
view of eases, thP antl1or of tlH· annotation '·Conc;titu-
tionalit~- of f;tntnte or Onhi:rn<'(' ~d n kin~· Om' Fad i'n'-
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sumptive or Prima Facie Evidence of Another," 162 
A.L.R. 495 (194G), states: 
''In solving this problem most of the courts 
apply the test which, though probably not origi-
nating in the United States Supreme Court, has 
found its clearest formulation in the decisions of 
our highest tribunal and ·which, in order for a 
statute to be constitutional, makes the require-
ment that there be a rational connection between 
the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed 
so that the inference of the one from proof of 
tlw otlwr is not unreasonable and arbitrary." 
Utah is in accord with this great weight of authority. 
In State 1). Potello, 40 Utah 56, 119 Pac. 1023 (1912), this 
court held: 
"It undoubtedly is the established rule by the 
great ·weight of authority that the legislature has 
the power to declare that certain facts shall be 
prima facie, presumptive, not conclusive, evidence 
of another and substantive fact essential to con-
viction when they have some fair relation to or 
connection with such other fact." 
Applying the test to the facts of the instant case, 
it is clear that, measured by common experience, the 
pr<'sm11ed fact follows from the fact proved. In relation 
to the proven fact the presumed fact is not arbitrary 
or unreasonable. 
The respondents are m business for the sole pur-
pose of making a profit. No sale is made without this 
objective in mind. A profit can only be made if an 
i1L•m is sold above the costs to the respondents. Where 
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the profit on one item is small, a high tnrnonr is neces-
sary. 
A sale by the respondents at below cost with the 
limitation of quantity obviously disregards both profit 
and turnover which combint>d constitnh• the whole pur-
pose> of being in hnsinc>ss. 
lt follows from snch an act that tl1(~ respondents 
have eitht'r abandoned the profit dement altogether or 
that they are looking for }Jl'ofit::; in another way. Since 
respondents are not charitable or non-profit organiza-
tions, any reasonable man would have to conclude the 
latter fact must be true. Enn the most simple analysit> 
would then lead all rPasonable pernons to conclude that 
the respondents had an intent by this activity to attract 
customers into the store upon the expf~ctation that they 
will purchase other items not markc>cl below cost. 
Nor can respondents explain this activity on the 
basis of an overstock of merchandise, since the limita-
tion of supply is inconsistent with a motive to clear out 
an oversupply of stock. If the real intent of the respond-
ents was only to clear the item, they should be anxious 
to sell as much of the stock as vossible to each custonwr. 
There is nothing in tlie statuw which makes the pre-
sumption conclnsi\'e. 'l'lrns, if any motive consistent 
with the sale below cost and limitat:<m of quantity could 
he shown, tlte presumption of imprnper int0nt is anto-
matically n•hutted. 
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POINT 3. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
STATUTORY DEFINITION OF COST IS UNCONSTITUTION-
ALLY AMBIGUOUS, VAGUE AND ABRITRARY. 
Any discussion of the lower court's findings in 
regard to vagueness of the statutory provisions and the 
reasonablf'ness of tlw classifications involved must be 
nndertaken within thf' frarnf'"·ork of applicablf' standards 
;;et np hy this Court. 
In regard to a consideration of vagueness, the test 
has heen defined as follows : 
"All restrictions on conduct should be de-
scribed with sufficient certainty, so that a person 
of ordinary intelligence, desiring to obey the law, 
may know how to govern themselves in conformity 
·with the statute .... The statute will not be held 
void for uncertainty if any sort of sensible, prac-
tical effect may be given it." State v. Packard, 
122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952). 
The above test has been repeatedly upheld by this Court: 
Kent Clitb v. Toronto, 6 U.2d 67, 305 P.2d 870 (1957); 
State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952); 
State v. Geurtz, 1l U.2d 345, 359 P.2d 12 (1961); State v. 
~fnssPr, 118 Utah 537, 223 P.2d 193 (1950). 
In applying the above test, the following rules have 
hef'n statf'd b~· this Court: 
"The statute is snfficiently certain if it em-
ploys words of long usage or with a common law 
meaning, notwithstanding an element of degree 
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in the definition as to which f'stimates might dif-
fer." State v. Nielsen. 19 F.2d GG, 426 P.2d 13 
( 1967). 
Where a word has a commonly accepted meaning, 
it cannot be held to he ambiguous. State v. Barlow, 107 
Utah 292, 153 P.2d G47 (19411), appeal dismissed, 324 U.S. 
829, reliearin.fJ denied, :i2+ D.R. 891. 
Absolute exactitude of Pxpression and completP prP-
eision of nwaning an• 1witlH'r expPd<'d nor requirt>d. 
State v. Packard, supra. 
It should be noted that m the instant case an in-
junction is sought and there is no attempt to invoke the 
criminal sanctions. In this regard tlw Colorado case of 
Flank Oil Company v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Com-
pany, 349 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 19GO), is instructive: 
"It would ::,;eem, howevPr, that whc~re the prob-
lem is that of proscribing future conduct thP 
notice to the citizen or the public aspect deserves 
less emphasis. Thus when a plaintiff seeks an 
injunction he is not demanding that the defendant 
be pm;iished but rather that he be restrained from 
acting unlawfully in the future. Consequently, the 
adjudication itself prO\'ides notice to the defend-
ant and i::,; prospective in its application. The 
result is that the defendant is not prejudiced by 
the failure of the statute to provide precise and 
adequate warning beforc>hand." 
Concerning \'ag1wm·'..;s gc11Pr&li)', tl1(, ms<' of U11ited 
States 1·. National Doii-.i; Co1'zJom!io11, :37:21'.8. ::m, ~J L.ed. 
2d ;)(i1 (1%2). should li(• not<·d. fo tliat <'HS(' 1liP Snprr>11w 
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Court of the United States rejected an argument of 
yagueness concerning provisions of the Robinson-Patman 
Act which made it a crime to sell goods at "unreasonably 
low prices for the purposP of destroying competition or 
eliminating a compditor." The court held that the quoted 
words W<'r<' not void for yaguPnPss. In the course of the 
opinion, tlw conrt noted a casP whPre a statute was held 
valid whPre it prohibited only intent to accomplish a spe-
eifie result, not specifying tlw acts which may lead to that 
result. The~ court noted that tlw Robinson-Patman Act 
was mneh mon• elear in that it not only specified the 
wrongful intent but also defined the prohibited conduct. 
The court held: 
"The act ht>re, however, in prohibiting sales 
at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of 
destroying competition, listed as elements of the 
illegal conduct not only the intent to achieve a 
resnlt -- destruction of competition - but also 
the act - selling at unreasonably low prices -
done in furtherance of that design or purpose. It 
seems clear that the necessary specificity of warn-
ing is afforded when, as here, separate, though 
related, statutory elements of prohibited activity 
come to focus on one course of conduct." 
The Utah statute, like the Robinson-Patman Act, 
:,;pecifies the type of conduct and the wrongful intent 
and thus is sufficiently clear. Moreover, confirmation of 
tlH• validity of the Robinson-Patman Act, after which 
tliP Utah Act was modeled, is authority for the validity 
of the Utah Act in regard to the claim of vagueness. 
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The test to be applied in the pres0nt case in ruling 
on the reasonableness of the varions classifications in 
the Utah Aet has been st?t out by this Court as follows: 
"In order to ~we whether tlw excluded classes 
or transactions are on a diffrrent basis than those 
includt?d, we must look at the purpos<' of the act. 
'l'he objects and purposes of a law present tlw 
touchstone for dt>termining· 11ro1Jer and improper 
elassifieations. 
* * * 
"It is only \dwre sonw 1wrsons or transar-
tions excluded from tlw operation of the law an-· 
as to the subject matter of the law in no differ-
entiable class from those included in its operation 
that the law is discriminator.'· in the sense of 
being arbitrary and uncom;titntional. If a reason-
able bas1:s to differPntiate thosl' incl1.tded from 
those excluded from its operation can bf fo11nd, 
it must be held constitutional." (E~mphasis added.) 
8tatr 1·. Mason, 94 etah 501, 78 P.2d 920 (1938). 
In applying this test, this Court has realized that 
in drafting legislation it is impossible to make a perfect 
classification. Thus, the fact that some transactions, 
items of co~t, or persons are excluded from the statute 
is no ground to hold the act arbitrary. There may be 
some overlap between classes included and classes ex-
cluded from the statute. State i:. J. B. & R. E. Walker, 
Inc., supra. 
This Court ha1; furtlwr rccognir,ed that when draft-
ing legislation to gonrn man.\' diff'<•r('nt t:-·pes of or-
ganizations and transad:on::; ::iOJll(> l<:~e\\•ay must bt> 
allowed so that th<-> l('µ::::-;\atioll will lw ('ff('etin• to eov<:>r 
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the varying individual characteristics of the entire group, 
J( ent Cliil> v. Toronto, supra. 
In applying the rule of the JI ason case, this Court 
has formulated the following guide lines: 
'''rhe legislatnre has wide discretion in de-
termining what shall come within the class of per-
mitted activities and what shall be excluded .... 
In determining whethPr or not this classification 
is nnconstitutional, it must he remembered that 
diserirnination is the verv essence of classifica-
tion and is not objectionabl0 unless founded upon 
distinctions which the court is compelled to find 
unreasonable .... Every reasonable presumption 
must be induldged in and every reason doubt re-
solved in favor of constitutionality." Broadbent 
v. Gibson, 105 U. 53, 140 P.2d 939 (1943), Accord, 
Gronlnnd v. Salt Lake City, 113 U. 284, 194 P.2d 
464 (l 94R ) . 
In making a classification the legislature has wide 
latitude and wide discretion, Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 
supra; Carter v. State Tax Commission, supra. 
The lower court's conclusion that the statutory defi-
nition of cost is vague and ambiguous is contrary to the 
rvidence and not in accordance with the weight of au-
thority. The cases cited and quoted on pages 14-16, supra, 
Pstablish beyond question that the word "cost" is not 
vaguP or ambiguous in the context of the present case. 
The record clearlv shows that the respondents had 
no clif ficulty in understanding that the statute required 
1 li<·rn to allocate various items of cost to the individual 
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product. The testimony of Mr. Sinclair, comptroller for 
the Skaggs organization, establishes that he knows ex-
actly what the statute requires and that his objection 
was not lack of understanding hnt rather the inconven-
iem·e of compliancP: 
"Q. . .. \Vonld yon describP what could be neces-
sary from an accounting point of view to 
determine cost accnratel.d 
"A. Yes. In m~· opinion we 'rnuld have to dP-
termine what tlw eost is to initiate the pur-
chase order, which I talked about a few min-
utes ago; what it would cost us to run this 
particular item through our receiving depart-
ment; what it would cost us for utilities; what 
it would cost us for rent; what it would cost 
us for salaries on the sales force; what it 
would cost us for salaries in the check stand, 
wrapping it, etc .... To me it would be an 
impractical problt'm. I would not say it would 
be impossible, but l would say it would be 
very impractical, and run our costs up to that 
point, I am sure, they just wouldn't be com-
mensurate with the situation involved." (Tr. 
105) 
Mr. Hayward, comptroller for the Grand Central 
organization, testified that it would require additional 
expense to allocate costs to each item of inventory (Tr. 
119). This opinion could not havP be(~n given if he had 
no idea of what tlw statute reqnirPd. 
lt is apparent from tlw entirl' testimony of Mr. 
Hayward and Mr. Sinclair that tlwy krn'w what was 
required by the statute. 'l'heir t0stimony invoh·ed an 
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extensive discussion of the allocation of costs. The whole 
import of their testimony was that they understood what 
was required, but that the requirements would necessi-
tate additional expense and inconvenience. 
ln addition to the conclusion that "cost" was am-
biguous, the lower court further held that the term 
"replacement cost" was nnconstitntionally vague and 
ambiguous. 
It requires some effort on the part of a merchant 
to import uncertainty into such a term. It is clear that 
the provision means the cost at which an item may be 
currently purchased. "Replacement cost" may be easily 
ascertained by merely keeping abreast of current market 
conditions. The term has been held not to violate the 
standard of vagueness. Hill v. K usy, 35 N.W.2d 594 
(Neb. 1949). 
POINT 4. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING CERTAIN 
PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS. 
The lower court held that the terms "unfairly di-
verting trade from a competitor" and "injuring a com-
petitor" are vague and ambiguous (Conclusion 1 (h) ). 
This finding 1s contrary to the overwhelming weight 
of authority. 
In Borden Company v. Thomason, 353 S.W. 2d 735 
( llfo. 1963), the court, considering a statute prohibiting 
f.:a]es below cost, held: 
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"Whether the act is committed with the intent 
or with the effect of 'unfairl>' diverting tradr 
from a competitor,' the court is, of course, com-
petent to decide and to gin a reasonable defini-
tion 3:nd construction of words used when a proper 
case is presented. Whether or not a sale below 
cost has unfairly divf'rfrd trade is a matter of 
proof in each instance and mnst depend upon thr 
facts and circumstances shown. rrhe provision is 
subject to reasonable interpretation .... The ad 
is not so vague, indefinite or uncertain in tllP 
respects mentioned as to dl'n>- dur procPss, bnt 
is a valid exercise of the po lier power." 
In Hill v. K usy, supra, the court upheld the validity 
of a sale belo-w cost statute, holding: 
"It is further argued that there is a lack of 
clarity, which renders the act void, in the meaning 
of the terms used in tlw act, such as ... 'unfairly 
diverting trade from a competitor.' The terms 
may present difficulties in application where tlw 
sufficiency of evidence in fact questions is pre-
sented. Mere difficulty of application in the pro-
cesses of litigation is not enough to enable a court 
to say that a statute is unconstitutional." 
Aside from the above cited cases, it is apparent by 
consideration of the individual words of the clause that 
it is not vague. It should be noted that, contrary to 
the defendants' allegations, part of the clause is defined. 
The word "unfair" obviously rPfers back to the terms 
"advertising, offrr to sell, or sale ... at less than cost." 
The statute in no way purports to make a blanket declar-
ation against all ''unfair praetices" lmt specifically dl'-
clarps what is "unfair." In <'onstrning a similar ad th<' 
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court in Laundry Operating Company v. Spalding Laun-
dr11 and Dry Cleaning Company, supra, stated: 
""\Ve do not suggest that a purpose to divert 
or capture a competitor's business is wrong or 
nnethical. It is perfectly legitimate as long as it 
is not carried out unfairly. The legislature has 
declared it unfair to accomplish it through giving 
away goods or servicf's or sf'lling them for less 
than cost.'' 
1 1~\·<'n if the statute did not define the word "unfair," 
it ~honld nevertheless stand against constitutional at-
tack. It has been held that in defining economic offenses, 
there may be latitude in setting up the exact nature of 
the prohibited acts. For example, in Nash v. United 
States, 229 U.S. 373, 57 L.ed. 1232 (1913), the defendant 
contended that the Sherman Act was unconstitutionally 
vague and that it prohibited only acts which prejudiced 
the public or restricted competition and thus reasonable 
mPn might not know in advance which acts will produce 
that specified result. The Supreme Court of the United 
States held that the difficulty did not render the act void. 
The permissible latitude in defining economic of-
fenses is apparent from the case of FTC v. Raladam Co., 
283 U.S. 643, 75 L.ed. 1324 (1931), which dealt with the 
term "unfair methods of competition" in the Federal 
'l'rade Commission Act. 
The words "diverting trade" have only one obvious 
mPaning. No one can seriously contend that this means 
anything other than causing customers to do business 
d:-;ewhere. 
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Further considering the individnal ·words in the 
clause, the term "competitor" has been repeatedly held 
to be a valid and clear team; a businessman knows who 
his competitors are, lllr:Elho11c 11• GPror, 292 N.vV. 414 
(Minn. 1940). 
It is clear from the record that the respondents know 
\d10 their "competitors" are (Tr. lO, '27, 28-29, 37, 42, 44). 
The court held that the krm '' l<>gal prire:-1 of com-
petitor" was unconstitutionally vagne and amb;gnons "if 
construc:d as requiring a rdailer to determi1w at his peril 
whether a comeptitor in advertising or selling the par-
ticular item is not a sale below cost as defined in the 
act with the intent prohibited by the act." (Conclusion 
l (k).) 
Appellants coneede that "if construed" as outlined 
by the court, the provision would be of doubtful validity. 
However, appellant asserts that the provision should 
not be so construed. Moreover, as noted above, the court 
has a duty to construe the statute in a manner which 
will uphold its validity. By using the words "if con-
strued," the lower court obviously abandoned this well 
established princ.iple. 
Construed properly, the provision has been repeated-
ly upheld as valid. If the statute is construed in the 
manner of the lower eourt, such a construction ignores 
the wording "an e11dcm·o1· i11 ,r;ood faith to met>t t]w legal 
prices of the competitor." By the wording of tlw statute, 
a merchant is required only to make some rPasonablP 
attempt to ascertain tlw kgality of t1w prie<', and will 
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be held only to the requirement that he make a reason-
able determination from the facts which are available 
to him. He need go no further than that. 
In People v. Payless Drug Store, 153 P.2d 9 (Calif. 
1944), tlw Supreme Court of California considered an 
identical provision in the California code and held as 
follows: 
"The dPfendants cont<'nd that thev should 
not lw comp0llt•d to ascertain the 'legal prices' of 
tlwir competitors before invoking the exception 
provided by subdivision D of Section 6 for the 
reason that it is impossible to ascertain the legal 
prices of a competitor's goods without an audit 
of their books. The defendants have assumed an 
absolute prerequisite. The requirement is not 
absolute. It is merely that the defendants shall 
have endeavored 'in good faith' to meet the legal 
prices of the competitor .... If a merchant in good 
faith reduces his prices to meet those of a com-
petitor, who he in good faith believes has a legal 
price, he will not be violating either the intent or 
the wording of the act." 
In State v. Sears, 103 P.2d 337 (Wash. 1940), the 
Supreme Court of Washington held : 
"It is contended by appellant that, while sec-
tion 1 of Chapter 221 contemplates that a mer-
chant may sell below cost, if he so desires, to meet 
legal competitive prices, to do so under the act 
would place upon such merchant the insuperable 
burden of determining whether the prices of com-
petitors are kgal. However, again we have been 
cikd to no case which sustains appellant's con-
h•ntion, where the act requires, as does the act in 
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the instant case, that any such sale must be made 
with the intent to destroy competition, and that 
legal co~petitive prices may be met, provided 
they are m good faith ... 
"We are, therefore, of the opinion that if a 
merchant in good faith reduces his prices to meet 
those of a competitor, who he in good faith be-
lieves has a legal price, he will not be violating 
either the intent or the wording of the act." Ac-
cord, State v. AlbPrtsons, Inc., 412 P.2d 755 
(Wash. 1966). 
In Mcintire v. Borofsky, 59 A. 2d 471 (N.H. 1948), 
the court held: 
"One of the exceptions to the act is 'where 
the price of merchandise is made in good faith 
to meet legal competition.' If this required the 
retailer to examine his competitor's books to as-
certain whether the competitors price was legal, 
it would be of doubtful validity. All that is re-
quired of the retailer, however, is an endeavor 
'in good faith' to meet legal prices of his competi-
tor." Accord, State v. Wokoff, 85 N.W. 2d 401 
(Minn. 1957). 
It is clear that by giving the statute a proper con-
struction, its constitutionaliy should be upheld. 
The lower court held the Act arbitrarily and uncon-
stitutional because it prohibited a sale below cost "where 
the only intent of the retailer in pricing the item below 
cost is to induce customers of that retailer to purchase 
other merchandise from that retailer." (Conclusion 
1 (g).) 
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This holding of the lower court is obviously aimed 
at the wisdom of the legislature in prohibiting merchants 
from using loss leader tactics in order to induce the 
purchase of other merchandise. 
As noted above, it is not the place of the lower 
court to question the wisdom or the necessity of the 
legislation. It is well established in the state that the 
courts will not replace their opinion for those of the 
legislature. 
POINT 5. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSIONS 
AS TO THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE ACT'S PRO-
VISIONS. 
The lower court held that Grand Central was en-
titled to assume, in the absence of actual knowledge of 
an illegal sale, that the Shoppers' Discount price for hair 
Rpray under Count 2 of the Complaint was legal. Accord-
ing to the case law cited above, this finding would be 
justified if there was any evidence that Grand Central 
made any good faith effort to determine the legality 
of the Shoppers' Discount price. However, the evidence 
does not give the slightest indication of good faith; in 
fact the evidence conclusively establishes a complete lack 
of good faith. 
Grand Central made no effort whatsoever to deter-
minP whether the Shoppers' Discount price was legal 
('Pr. 1 l). The justification for this was that it involved 
:-;omp inconvenience because there were several suppliers 
nr. 12)' and that the information may not be precise 
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(Tr. 12). Again, it should be noted that mere inconven-
ience is no excuse for noncompliance. Moreover, the 
fact that the information from the suppliers may not 
be precise does not mean that the information would not 
be a helpful guide. With their detailed experience and 
knowledge of market conditions, including special sales, 
discounts, rebates, allowances, etc., the respondents would 
be able to judge within a narrow range whether or not 
the price offered by Shoppers' Discount on any given 
product is legal. The~- wonld he pnt on notice if the pric(l 
were unusually low and they vrnuld act at their peril 
only if they met such a price without making reasonable 
inquiry as to whether it was legal. 
Appellant :o;ubmits that the t>vidence compels the 
conclusion that the real purpose in not making any 
inquiry was that Grand Central did not care whether or 
not the Shoppers' Discount price ·was legal and that 
Grand Central was, in fact, prepared to meet the pricf• 
and then some in order to protect and enhance it's "low 
cost image." The complete lack of good faith by both 
respondents is established by the following testimony 
of Mr. Warshaw, Secretary of Grand Central, and Mr. 
Austin, the Supervisor of Skaggs Stores: 
"A. . .. We have built a large following on hair 
goods. We don't want our customers' atten-
tion turned awav from the fact that we do 
have a place wh~re the customer can get al-
most anything in hair goods, so if somebody 
independent was to sell an item below cost 
we would immediatelv come right back on 
them so that the cns.torner knows that not 
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only do we have the variety but we are not 
being undersold. (Tr. 24) 
* * * 
"A. : .. The only thing we tell our management 
is that they must be competitive in our mar-
ket. 'Ne don't tell them what the price would 
be on that particular item. 
"Q. And you tell them they must be competitive. 
"A. Right. 
"Q. And you must be competitive, isn't that true, 
rPgardless of ·what the competitive price is? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And regardless of whether or not the price 
is legal under Utah law? 
"A. YPs. (Tr. 43) 
• • • 
"Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Warshaw, that in your 
operation you determine to meet competition 
whether or not you have to sell below cosU 
"A. Yes. (Tr. 29) 
• • • 
"Q. With reference to the factors in pricing, Mr. 
Waldo asked you if you had other factors, 
other than what I considered the overriding 
factor is competitive price. Isn't it a fact, 
Mr. Austin, that although you do have other 
factors in mind in a normal situation, those 
factors go out the window if a competitor 
lowers the price of a particular item? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And you will meet or beat that price1 
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"Q. So the competitive price in the thing that 
will overcome everything else in your deci-
sion if need be~ 
"A. If need he, yes." ( 'l'r. 50) 
Properly construed, the statute merely requires good 
faith. As noted above, there is no basis in the evidence 
to find good faith on the part of Grand Central or Skaggs 
in meeting the price of Shoppers' Discount on hair spray. 
The proper remedy when a competitor s<'lls below 
cost is an injunction under the Act, not retaliatory price 
cutting. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers 
Ass'., 360 U.S. 334, 3 L.ed. 2d 1280 (1959), affirming, 322 
P.2d 179 (Okla. 1957). 
The lower court held that where a retailer sells an 
item at a price above its cost, and gives away with the 
purchase another item, the legality of the price is deter-
mined only on the cost of the item sold; the combined 
cost of the two items is not to be considered. The court 
reasoned that since one of the items was not "sold," its 
cost should ~ot be a factor in determining the legality 
of the price of the combined items. 
This finding is not in accordance with the wording 
of the statute. Section 13-5-9 (1) states: 
"For the purpose of preventing evasion of 
this act in all sales involving more than one itern 
or communitv the Vt'ndor's or distributor's sell-
ing price shall not be h(•]ow the cost of all articles, 
products, and commodities incluch•d in such trans-
n 
l-,, 
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actions. Each article, product or commodity indi-
vidually advertised or offered for sale, shall be 
individually subject to the requirements of Sec-
tion 13-5-7, when sold with other articles, products 
or commodities." (Emphasis added.) 
'l1he term in the first sentence, "all sales involving more 
than one item," assunws that tlwre must be a "sale," 
hnt there is no reason to aswrne that the items "involved" 
must also he the ones ·which are for sale. If a seller 
offrrs a earton of cigardtes at a specified price and 
also adwrtises that he will give away a lighter with the 
tarion of cigarettes sold, the sale "involves" both the 
carton of cigarettes and the lighter and under the above 
qnoted wording of 13-5-9, the cost to the seller of both 
items must he taken into account in complying with the 
Act. 
ln regard to Count 7 of the Complaint, it is stipu-
lated that Grand Central sold Lee pants below cost. 
Urand CPntral contended that it sold the pants at that 
price for the i:;ole purpose of reducing an excessive in-
\'entory and the court concluded that there was an in-
sufficient showing of improper intent because of the wish 
to clear out the excessive supply. 
']'his finding is unsupportable by the evidence. First, 
it should be noted that Grand Central limited the quan-
tity that each customer could purchase (Tr. 25-26). If 
the sole pnrpose was to clear the item, it follows that 
tht:·v would not onlv be willing but anxious to sell as many . . 
pairs of pants as possible to each customer. The limi-
1 at ion of supply is inconsistent with a sole intent to 
1•IP:lr the item from inventory. 
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It also may be that a competitor of Grand Central 
has made a good estimate of suppl~- of Lee pants. He 
should not be subjected to a complete market breakdow11 
because Grand Central has an oversupply. 
It is obvious that the sale to reduce innntory is madP 
so that purchasers will come in and buy from Grand 
Central rather than from its competitors. 'rhe fact of 
an oversupply in no way alters the fact that the sale is 
madt> to divPrt trade to Grand Central. 'rhe diversion 
injures both competitors who also have an o\·ersuppl~­
and competitors who have estimated sales volume cor-
rectly. Other retailers should not be forced to lose money 
on items such as Lee pant so that the large retailer can 
reduce his inventory. 
'rhe lower court held that when• a n~tailer obtains 
items such as turkeys at a specified cost and the demand 
is so high that the supply obtained at that cost is sold 
out and an additional supply must lw purchased, the 
higher cost of the additional purchase may be ignored 
and the turkeys may be sold as though the previous 
lower cost applied. This holding completely ignores the 
provisions of the Act and completely undermines the 
effect of the Act by allowing a low cost to be perpetuated 
indefinitely. 
Under this holding a ri:>taikr once having negotiated 
a low cost may advertise a legal 1)rice based upon that 
cost and then indefinitely ignore the higher cost of sub-
sequent lH!l'chases of the item which make• tlte original 
price illegal. Snell a rnling should IH~ n~versecl as an 
attempt to undermine t1w Act and nullify its effect. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is clearly the policy of the Utah Legislature to 
give to both the retailer and the consumer the right to 
benefit from a healthy and competitive economy in this 
statP. In carrying out this policy, the legislature has 
protect1'd the right of new organizations to enter into 
competition in various industries by the provisions of 
tlw Pool::; and 'l'rusts Act, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
Titl<' fiO, Chapter 1. It has also sought to protect these 
organizations affrr their entry into various industries 
by enactment of the Unfair Practices Act with which we 
are involved in this case. These legislative enactments, 
if enforced, guarantee that no retailer will lawfully 
engage in predatory practices which destroy competi-
tion and thereby limit the long term right of the con-
sumer to choose with whom he will deal. The need for 
and value of the Unfair Practices Act in accomplishing 
the policy of the legislature is apparent from a compari-
son of the period when it was actively enforc<"d and the 
period when its enforcement was abandoned prior to 
the trial of this case. 
The statute, aimed at the cutthroat price-cutting 
practices of large retailers, no doubt imposes some in-
convenience on organizations which choose to prove a 
cost lower than G%. Moreover, the statute, like any trade 
regulation law, does not provide a clear and concise 
answer for every conceivable accounting problem which 
large retailers may interpose. The Act, however, does 
]lrovick sufficiently clear and definite standards and 
g·11iclPlinPs to 1wrrnit compliance without undue hardship 
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or difficulty to the retailer. Certainly, the benefit dt>-
rived from a healthy competitive economy far outweighx 
any inconvenience incident to compliance with the statu-
tory provisions. Further detai I and certainty are not 
only unnecessary but wonld be undc,sirahle in that they 
would unduly limit tlw flt>xihility of tlw A('t. 
lt is submitted that tlw :,;alP-hPl<rw-cot->t provision~ 
of the Unfair Practices Aet an' not only proper and 
reasonable but that their <'nforemwnt is ind:s1wnsab!P 
to the preservation of a competitive climate in the retail 
food industry in Utah. The Act complies with the re-
quirements of the Constitution of this state and of the 
United States. It should be nplwld and enforcPd. 
Respectfully· snhmitted, 
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